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PREFACE
The World Commission on Dams ("WCD") completed its work in
the second part of 2000. The WCD presented its report, Dams and
Development, in November 2000 and conducted its meeting in late
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February 2001. It served as an occasion for the wide range of
stakeholders, who had accompanied and contributed to the
Commission's work, to respond to the report, share information on
subsequent steps, and discuss proposals for common action to take
the debate further.
As expected, reactions to the report have been diverse. It is
gratifying that praise has come from a wide range of individuals
concerned with water and energy development issues, who support
the fundamental values and principles on which the report's
conclusions are based. Most of the critical reaction was expected.
The report represents a significant departure from traditional thinking
on the role of large dams in water and energy development. It also
introduces several considerations that were not previously given
much weight in decision-making. This will take some getting used
to.
Ten months have passed since the Commission's findings were
made public. The report-its values, principles, guidelines, and
recommendations-has been bequeathed to the broad and diverse
constituencies concerned with large dams. It is a tool with which
they must develop better processes, better decisions, and better
development outcomes in the areas where large dams constitute an
ingredient in the development mix. Ten months is too short a period
of time to judiciously assess the impact of the WCD. It is, however,
long enough to look back at the Commission's process and reflect on
its significance.
It is my honor to introduce this special issue of the American
University International Law Review, devoted to the WCD, to reflect
on the Commission-why it came about, where it came from, how it
has worked, what obstacles it had to overcome, and how it pioneered
new approaches to consensus building. I shall offer my view on what
succeeded and why, as well as the challenges that lie ahead.
The WCD marks a milestone in the slow process of adjustment to
a new development paradigm. As such, its significance extends
beyond the issue of large dams. Its findings are, with little
adaptation, broadly relevant to large infrastructure developments
anywhere, and in large measure, to the process of development




Recently, it has become common practice to attribute all change,
positive and negative, to globalization. The concept has become an
almost meaningless cliche. Rapid change on a global scale is easily
understood. Local, national, or regional changes having a global
impact are similarly comprehensible. Behind the clich6 of
"globalization" is a subliminal fear that the pace of change has spun
out of control, and shifted or eliminated the fixed reference points
from which we used to derive our security. It is also contended that
the benefits of globalization have been disproportionate between the
South and the North. This fear excites some, who imagine a
technological revolution that will raise humanity to a new plateau of
prosperity and well-being. Others-perhaps more numerous-fear
anarchy where unknown and unrevealed forces rob humanity of its
autonomy, identity, and character.
While it is not our intention to debate globalization, it is important
to note that the WCD could not have come about, nor achieved
success, had it not been for some of the major changes witnessed
over the past couple of decades under the guise of "globalization."
Three of these changes appear to be of particular significance:
The Rapid Spread of Informiation Technology, now accessible
almost worldwide, even to remote areas. It has reduced both the time
and cost to communicate, such that communication worldwide is
now almost instantaneous and accessible to most organized groups.
This has led to the "globalization" of many local issues by offering
local groups a global audience for their issues. It has greatly
increased the effectiveness of civil society networks and the impact
of their campaigns. It has also put considerable pressure on such anti-
democratic behavior as corruption, human rights abuses, and
censorship.
The Internationalization of Capital, made easier to gain access to
capital in other countries and regions, and to expand investors' reach
of their activities well beyond their borders. One resulting collateral
effect is the rising pressure on investors from developed countries
not to apply lower standards in their international operations than
they would at home. Experience in this area has lent considerable
momentum to movements calling for corporate social and
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environmental responsibility. It has stimulated a debate about which
standards should justifiably be applied, thus opening the door for a
new examination of human rights, governance, and democracy
issues.
The Increased Pace of Change, placing enormous adaptive
pressures on our institutions. It is interesting to note in this context
that globalization offers a competitive advantage to those institutions
with the greatest capacity to adapt rapidly-favoring corporations
and civil society over national governments and intergovernmental
organizations. It has also prompted different groups to experiment
with cooperative approaches across sectors, in part, to overcome the
obstacles to change inherent in some institutional partners.
A. REDEFINING ROLES
Attributable to globalization or not, the roles of corporations, the
public sector, and civil society have been redefined. The change in
the role of national governments is the most evident-and most
significant for the case of the WCD. National governments have
witnessed a three-way migration of the authority-voluntary or
involuntary-once vested in them:
Upward migration to supranational structures with functions once
vested solely in the State, such as the European Union ("EU"), the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), or the World Trade
Organization ("WTO");
Downward migration to regional and local levels of government,
in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity and in response to public
demand for lighter central government structures; and
Outward migration to the market, corporations, and elements of
civil society. Many functions formerly resting with government are
now privatized, or abandoned and adopted by non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") and other elements of civil society.
I suggest above that those groups with the greatest adaptive
capacity have benefited from rapid global change, while those with
the greatest difficulty in embracing change have suffered. Prominent
among these are the intergovernmental institutions at the forefront of
global economic management-the World Bank, the IMF, the
1414 [16:1411
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WTO-and to a lesser extent the organizations of the United
Nations. These organizations, despite attempts at communication
with NGOs, retain a decision-making structure that is barely
accountable to governments. The World Bank is the agency in this
group most relevant to the dams debate. Its traditional mode of
operation-high-level dealing with central governments on the basis
of a technical dossier-too often leads to results that are problematic,
leaving behind a number of failures. The factors behind these failures
are significant for the dams debate, as seen below.
1. The Collapse of the Washington Consensus
The collapse of the Washington consensus and the search for a
new paradigm to replace it are the final elements needed to place the
WCD in context. For most of the 1980s and 1990s, it was difficult to
counter the powerful macroeconomic ideology that stated that the
rapid removal of barriers to trade and to the flow of capital would
place countries on an accelerated path to prosperity. While
acknowledging that the period of adjustment could lead to some
social and environmental dislocation, this ideology insisted that the
new growth would generate the means to address the problems thus
caused.
It is now evident that while the Washington consensus approach
did indeed stimulate growth, it did so at the cost of increasing
income gaps between rich and poor countries, and between the rich
and poor within countries. It greatly benefited those with access to
capital-in particular large corporations and shareholders-while
worsening social and environmental conditions, and creating a large
mass of "excluded" people. During the past two decades, the gaps in
income distribution have continued to widen. Thus, while the major
international institutions governing the macro-economic regime have
all solemnly rededicated themselves to poverty alleviation, the
application of their policies reinforces a system that has contributed
both to the generation of substantial wealth and to the deepening of
the poverty gap worldwide.
2. Elements of the New Development Paratign
The WCD stems from the growing backlash against this model of
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development, and offers a more structured, positive, and constructive
version of the street protests now part and parcel of most
international trade or economic summits. It is part of a wide front of
experimentation both to identify, design, and implement a new
development paradigm, and to identify a new set of macroeconomic
reference points. The WCD is a product of globalization. It is, in
effect, a child of the backlash against a failed model of development,
one in which economic development trumped wider social and
environmental concerns.
What will the new development paradigm look like? While to date
there is no new broadly accepted standard, its elements are becoming
clearer. Perhaps the most exciting trend is the gradual convergence
of models of development with human rights. The human rights
debate and the right to development debate once occupied separate
and differentiated spaces and constituencies. It has become clear over
the past decade that successful and lasting development requires a set
of preconditions. It is not simply a matter of applying economic
resources to problems. Rather, investment will only yield sustainable
results if institutions are in place and functioning, systems of
governance are democratic and accountable, and basic freedoms are
respected.
The title of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen's recent book,
Development as Freedom, encapsulates this new thinking: "Without
basic human freedoms, development efforts are built on sand." The
United Nations Development Program ("UNDP") 2000 Human
Development Report focused entirely on the linkage between human
rights and human development, a significant departure for one of the
leaders of the "right to development" thinking. The World Bank, in a
recent report by David Dollar and Lant Pritchett entitled Assessing
Aid. What Works, What Doesn't and Why, seeks to demonstrate that
development investment in countries without the basic institutions of
democracy, good governance, and fundamental freedoms generally
leads to disappointing results. In contrast, such investment yields
significant development benefits in countries that respect the
fundamental freedoms.
This convergence between human development and human rights
ideologies is significant because it extends beyond mere economic
and institutional analysis of development, to a theory fundamentally
1416 [16:1411
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grounded in human rights concepts. Moreover, in underlining the
universal nature of human rights, it progresses beyond the relativistic
arguments behind which a great deal of human suffering has been
hidden. It is to be hoped that environmental thinking will also follow.
When that happens, we might anticipate a new "consensus." It will
likely resemble the idea of sustainable development. The WCD
represents perhaps the first solid application of this triple
convergence.
3. Origins ofthe WCD
The evolution of the development debate described above sets the
stage for a significant shift in the dams debate and offers a general
explanation of the background against which the WCD was
established. The specific trajectory that led to the formation of the
WCD is worth tracing.
One need not think too far back to recall the days when large dam
projects were a matter of significant national pride. Heads of states
inaugurated large dams that carried the names of presidents, graced
the covers of nationalist magazines, and adorned postage stamps.
They encapsulated, in a very visible way, man's (and I use the term
advisedly) taming and harnessing of the forces of nature. They were
a potent symbol of progress and of the escape from the seemingly
inexorable grind of poverty and deprivation. A politician promising a
dam triggered in the public imagination the promise of jobs, power,
industry, and development. Dams provided electricity, water, and
crops-the fundamental and undeniable requirements of a better life.
The twentieth century witnessed a steady increase in the building
of large dams. It evolved from a trickle in the early decades, to a
steady stream in the decades following the Second World War, and
finally to a roaring stream in the three "dam decades" of the sixties,
seventies and eighties. Between 1970 and 1975, nearly five thousand
large dams were built, resulting in a dam-building frenzy of
approximately three "dam starts" per day for five years. The dam-
building wave began in richer countries and then slowly moved
South. Currently, over half of the world's large dams' are in China
1. The WCD used the definition of large dams adopted by the International
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and India, and approximately two thirds are in the developing world
overall, where most of the remaining potential still lies. Dams
provide ninety-three percent of Brazil's electric power and more than
ninety-nine percent of Norway's. They provide the irrigation water
responsible for some twelve to sixteen percent of world food
production and are the principal source of domestic water supply for
cities around the world. They perform an indispensable service in
controlling floods and in providing both water and power for
industrial development.
Dams were a popular answer to a wide range of fundamental
human needs throughout the first four-fifths of the twentieth century.
While they sometimes excited local controversy, they rarely attracted
more than episodic notice by the wider public.
However, in the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, dam
projects excited controversy, served as the object of ever-larger and
more successful campaigns, and began to take their place as one of
the most contested and spumed forms of development intervention
worldwide. Anti-dam campaigns began to achieve notable successes.
Dam projects were subject to long delays, escalating costs, and a
sharply increased level of investment risk. The number of large dams
commissioned fell from a high of 5,418 in the 1970s, to 2,069 in the
1990s, and the downward trend is continuing. Dams are no longer
seen as the proud symbols of progress they once were, and some
countries, such as the United States, decommission more large dams
than they currently build. The debate now focuses on the practicality
of removing more dams and the cost of compensating those harmed.
Dams have become intensely controversial; the pendulum has swung
to the other extreme.
II. WHAT WENT WRONG? A LOOK AT HOW THE
DAM INDUSTRY CHANGED
Understanding the answer to this question is essential to
understanding the genesis of the Commission. Described above, the
answer rests on three factors relating to the changing context. First, it
Commission on Large Dams ("ICOLD"), namely dams over 15m in height, and




is important to note that the dam-building industry was in trouble,
even without the damaging pressure from dam opponents. The
technology for power generation, irrigation, drinking water supply,
and flood management developed significantly. Further, large dams
must now compete with more efficient and considerably less
expensive forms of generating energy as a result of greatly improved
technology in coal, oil and gas-fired electricity, and innovations in
the field of renewable energy. As the efficiency of transmission and
storage of energy increases, dispersed generation has replaced large-
scale, centralized generation.
A. INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY
Although less dramatic, innovations in irrigation technology have
also changed the economics of large dams built for agricultural
production. Improvements in irrigation management often offset the
need for new water impoundments. The same is true in other areas.
Thus, the economics of water and energy development have turned
against large dams, in favor of other methods of meeting pressing
development demands. The trend towards full-cost accounting in
development investment has also negatively impacted large dams.
Dams, like nuclear power, have benefited from conditions not
available to other sources of water or energy such as subsidies, low-
cost credit, government guarantees, tax holidays, and monopoly
rents-things that once skewed the economics of water and energy
development in their favor. The gradual dismantling of such
conditions has soured the economics of large dam building. The
dams industry--especially the hydropower sector-faced trouble
even without the Commission and anti-dam campaigns.
B. EXTENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE
Large infrastructure projects are particularly vulnerable to
negative campaigns, both because of their visibility and because they
involve a large upfront investment before profits are realized. Large
dam projects take years to design, years to make their way through
the decision-making stages, and many more years to build. During
this time, they often serve as potent symbols of everything that dam
opponents dislike-alleged abuse of political power, corruption,
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disregard for affected people, and the sacrifice of environmental
integrity. Their high visibility is an important factor in the success of
opposition campaigns.
The nature of the investment also increases the visibility of these
projects. Although less dramatically than in mining, where the
industry is more vertically integrated, massive investment-much of
which is made before the dam begins to yield benefits-characterizes
dam projects. Years into a project, it is typical to witness tens of
millions of dollars expended or committed, without a penny of return
in the form of electricity sold or water rents collected. At this stage,
investors are vulnerable, a fact that has not escaped the notice of dam
opponents. Their increasing success in agitation against exposed
investors set the stage for the Commission's attempt to work out a
compromise.
Finally, I have noted that the great majority of large dams built in
the past decades are located in the developing world. In most cases,
because of the scale of investment required, they have relied on
international financing and on expertise and technology from foreign
contractors. Indeed, most large dams built today involve international
consortia with banks, insurance providers, engineers, equipment
suppliers, and technical specialists from many different countries,
typically in Western Europe or North America.
C. ACCOUNTABILITY
Members of such consortia are increasingly held accountable at
home for their activities abroad and are pressured to apply the same
standards to their international operations. The highly effective
campaigns against cheap child labor demonstrate that new standards
of transparency are a reality and that new standards of accountability
are forthcoming. Most corporations can withstand an incident
leading to negative publicity, but few can ignore high-profile
negative publicity sustained over a period of years. Increasingly, the
game for corporations is reputation management, since reputation is
a key factor in maintaining share value. With the price of controversy
growing, the option of a negotiated settlement looks increasingly
attractive.
What applies to the corporate world applies also, to a large extent,
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to international organizations. The NGOs -50 Years is Enough"
campaign damaged the World Bank in spite of its impressive
political and economic power. Similarly, the WTO has suffered a
sharp loss of legitimacy after Seattle, despite the importance of trade
liberalization to economic growth.
D. ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank played a critical role in the establishment of the
WCD. The incoming President, James Wolfensohn, committed the
Bank to greater transparency, and to greater accountability to the
Bank's investors. He also promised greater accountability in terms of
the development benefits achieved (or missed) as a result of Bank
projects, and a greater opportunity for NGOs and other outsiders to
gain access to Bank information and to contribute to reviews of Bank
policies and practice. The World Bank Inspection Panel, which hears
cases brought by people aggrieved by Bank projects in their area, and
the Ombudsman's office established in the Bank's International
Finance Corporation, serve as examples of this new openness in
practice. So, too, is the enhanced role given (and greater attention
paid) to the Bank's own Operations Evaluation Department
("OED"), an example of the new transparency.
In 1994, the Wappenhans Report documented the high failure rate
of Bank projects, shaking the Bank's confidence. At the same time,
the OED undertook a survey of 50 large dam projects implemented
through funding from the World Bank. They looked both at the
success of the development objectives of the dam, and the extent to
which the Bank's own polices and guidelines had been respected in
the course of project design and implementation. In keeping with the
new trend of greater openness, accountability, and opportunities for
NGO participation, the OED asked the World Conservation Union
("IJCN") to join in hosting an open workshop to provide an
independent review of the report. The IUCN and the World Bank
planned an expert meeting at IUCN Headquarters in Gland,
Switzerland, beginning in April 1997.
The emerging international water debate also provides useful
context for discussion of the WCD Report. The 1990s saw the rapid
emergence of the international water debate and a rapid shuffling
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among institutions eager to shape and lead the debate, prominent
among which was the World Bank. The environmental frenzy
surrounding Rio triggered the World Bank to paper the globe with
National Environmental Action Plans, and to secure a dominant
position in the new Global Environment Facility. The announcement
of the Kyoto Protocol and the promise of a new market for carbon
trading led to the rapid establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund.
Today the emphasis is on poverty alleviation. In the 1990s the Holy
Grail was water. Securing the prize was important to all. The debate
on water use could not be endangered over the dams debate-hence
the Gland meeting.
E. THE GLAND MEETING
The World Bank's OED wanted an independent, objective review
of its report. What did that mean? What standards of objectivity
should be applied? From the beginning, the World Bank and IUCN
debated on the design, conduct, and participants in the Gland
meeting. This debate preceded the creation of the WCD, because it
came down to the issue of legitimacy. Questions arose as to who
would be a legitimate participant, who held a stake in the dams
debate, and criteria for qualification.
In the end, the World Bank and the IUCN-the Commission's two
"midwives"-agreed on a number of issues that would become the
basic building blocks of the WCD. They agreed that no legitimate
debate could exclude any significant player, no matter how extreme
their views. They agreed that the debate needed to include
representatives of the different currents in the debate, and that those
sides should be balanced. Further, they agreed that there could be no
a prioris; the debate would go where the evidence led it.
As a result, the Gland meeting in April 1997-though often tense,
with open controversy brimming near the surface-was a pilot run
for the WCD itself. It gathered 39 participants from different
governments, the industry association of the dam builders, and
representatives of dam-affected peoples. It included water and
energy development professionals, environmentalists, sociologists,
and engineers. The World Bank and the IUCN, by prior agreement,
each limited its own participation to five members.
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Despite the quality of the debate, and the generally good
atmosphere that reigned (someone, inevitably, suggested that the
"Spirit of Gland" be declared), the meeting could do no more than
agree on the priorities for further work. They agreed that:
Since no comprehensive, independent assessment of the impact of
dams on development existed, the public debate on the merits of
large dams remained a debate with varying purposes. Any attempt to
reach broad agreement on large dams as an option for meeting water
and energy needs would require such an assessment to be made.
Going beyond controversy and conflict necessitated a common basis
for judging large dam projects. Such agreement required negotiation
among all stakeholders.
Neither the World Bank, nor the IUCN, on its own had the
credibility or capacity to host such a process, nor was it possible to
identify any combination of existing institutions that would be
acceptable to all parties. Thus, they recommended the establishment
of an independent, time-bound Commission, to be entrusted with the
two tasks set out above.
The two "midwives" had the responsibility of establishing the
Commission in close consultation with the Gland meeting
participants, who themselves acted as an informal reference group of
the process.
III. THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS
The nine months during the WCD's formation proved to be a
dramatic stage in the WCD life-cycle and merits an article in its own
right. It is a case study not only in multi-stakeholder processes, but
also in seeking and finding common ground among people and
constituencies with diverse perspectives, languages, and reference
points.
The challenge consisted of choosing a group of thirteen men and
women whom all the key stakeholder groups would consider to
represent their views and an acceptable balance overall. To
complicate matters further, Commission members had to be
representative of all geographical regions and from the key dam-
building countries. Moreover, they had to strike an acceptable gender
balance. The Commission had to represent governments, the private
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sector, and civil society-the latter consisting of both dam-affected
people and indigenous groups. Lastly, it had to reflect a full range of
skills and experience (engineering, environment, social sciences,
etc.), as well as a full range of professions associated with dam-
building (regulation and project finance, dam-building and operation,
hydropower, irrigation and water supply).
The process was not perfect. The dams industry never lost the
grudging feeling that their perspective was underrepresented on the
Commission. Moreover, one of the key government players, Shen
Guoyi from China, had to step down due to illness. Nevertheless, the
quality of the individuals on the Commission, the balance that-
despite some grumbling-was sought and achieved, and the
solidarity and team spirit that emerged over the two-year period of
our work, accounted for our success. I would like here to salute the
talent, energy, and dedication of the Commission, which I believe to
be unique in the history of such endeavors.
A. THE SECRETARIAT
The Commission's members chose Achim Steiner to sit on the
Commission and chair its Secretariat. If the World Bank and the
IUCN were the godparents of the WCD, Steiner was surely the
matchmaker. It was his work in the IUCN's Washington office that
built the World Bank's trust in the IUCN, and that ultimately led to
the Gland meeting. He was a natural choice to lead the Secretariat.
However, his appointment resulted after an exhaustive selection
process.
Steiner assembled an excellent and highly experienced group of
men and women from around the globe and turned them in very little
time into a highly effective work force. It is clear that the work of the
Commission could not have reached its successful conclusion
without the data-gathering, analysis, and background preparation
undertaken by the Secretariat. Nor would it have been possible if the
Secretariat had been composed only of technical experts. In fact, the
Secretariat sought, in its make-up and skills, to mirror the balance
and diversity of the Commission. This not only made for lively
debates in the Cape Town offices, but it also meant that what was
submitted to the Commission for consideration had already
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undergone the multicultural and multi-perspective screens of the
Secretariat. Many of the rough spots were already sanded down by
the hands of the Secretariat, leaving the key issues for the
Commission to debate.
Any commission can only be the tip of the iceberg. While it may
scintillate magnificently in the sun, it relies on the dark mass beneath
the surface to hold it up to the sun. The consistently high-quality
support of the Secretariat was and is fundamental to the WCD's
success.
B. THE WCD FORUM
The Gland group did not simply disperse after the April 1997
meeting. It was far too valuable. Indeed, it was the source of the
WCD's mandate and one of the main sources of its legitimacy. It
played an important role as a reference group in the choice of
Commission members, and collectively constituted an invaluable
source of advice, expertise, and ideas.
On the advice of the Gland group, the Commission established a
WCD Forum to accompany its work. The Forum based itself on the
balance represented by the Gland group, but not exclusively on its
exact membership. It consisted of organizations (rather than
individuals) and roughly doubled the size of the Gland group. This
group of sixty-eight members had no formal role in the mandate of
the WCD. Instead, it constituted a reference body, a corps of
advisors, and a bouncing board for the Commission.
The Forum met three times in the course of the Commission's
work. The first meeting was held in conjunction with the
Commission meeting in Prague, and served as an opportunity to
review and discuss the Commission's work program. It provided the
Commission with its first "reality check."
The second meeting took place in Cape Town in April 2000, at a
time when the Commission was more than halfivay through its work
program, and had gathered most of the material on which the report
was to be based. This meeting served to test many of the ideas that
were beginning to crystallize in the Commission debates. It mapped
out the currents that were raging in the Commission's constituencies
and the danger points around which the Commission would need to
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navigate.
The Forum called its final meeting in late February 2001 over four
months after the Commission launched its report. The timing of this
meeting was important because there was still significant momentum
generated by the release of the WCD Report. However, the meeting
also took place sufficiently long after the public unveiling of the
report such that the members of the Forum had the opportunity to
study the report and discuss it within their own constituencies.
This meeting afforded Forum members the opportunity to react to
the Commission report, report on actions taken pursuant to it, and
seek support for activities aimed at furthering the dams debate. In a
very realistic way, this final Forum meeting marked the assumption
of the Commission's mantle by the broader constituency concerned
with energy and water development. It signified the final passing of
the torch to the Commission's proper heirs.
The Forum concluded that optimizing the impact of the WCD
report required actions to be taken beyond the initiatives of
individual stakeholder groups. The international nature of the WCD
process should now be expanding the debate further at the country
and institutional level. The focus of the activities is now placed on
providing information and assistance.
The final Forum meeting agreed on the establishment of the Dams
and Development Unit ("DDU"), a small office that would be
charged with facilitating the exchange of information among all
stakeholders about initiatives and outcomes relating to dams and
development. The WCD Secretariat will continue to carry out
dissemination and communication efforts while preparing for a
smooth transition to the DDU in August 2001.
C. THE PROCESS
Chapter 1 (and in more detail Annex III of the Commission report)
chronicles the process followed by the Commission, its detailed work
plan, and its work through nine meetings between May 1998 and
August 2000. It will not be repeated here. Suffice to say, given the
time and resources available to the Commission, it took on and
accomplished a highly ambitious work program. This included both
the construction of a thorough knowledge-base on which the contents
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of the report rest, and a program of outreach and openness.
Moreover, the Commission's work program included the
organization of public consultations, the reception and analysis of
hundreds of voluntary submissions, and a massive effort to keep an
interested public informed as the Commission proceeded through its
work.
There will be those who claim that the knowledge-base was
inadequate, or that the opportunities to participate in the process
were too circumscribed. In response, I insist on the "givens" facing
the Commission. It took on a task with a given budget framework
and a given time limit upon which our legitimacy and success
depended. The Commission believes that the final report is fully
supported by the knowledge assembled and analyzed without
ignoring any important perspectives gathered during the public
consultations, through submissions, thousands of messages, and
statements received on the web, via e-mail or by post.
In the end, there was one key element to the success of the
Commission process: twelve men and women of integrity,
representing every significant perspective in the dams debate,
unanimously agreeing upon and signing the report-embracing all of
the values, principles, guidelines, and recommendations contained
therein.
D. A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS
History will judge the Commission and assess the impact of its
work. It claims no more than what it set out to do: "to assess the
development effectiveness of large dams and assess alternatives for
water resources and energy development; and to develop
internationally-acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards, where
appropriate, for the planning, design, appraisal, construction,
operation, monitoring and decommissioning of dams." The report
does that, but it also does more. I will now turn to a few features that
contributed significantly to the Commission's success, as well as
ways in which the significance of the Commission extends beyond
the strict mandate cited above.
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1. Legitimacy of the WCD
First, I believe the WCD enjoyed exceptional legitimacy. As an
independent international Commission, it enjoyed the advantage that
all of its predecessors have enjoyed-a relatively unencumbered
space and time in which to reach its conclusions, and a solemn public
undertaking to judge it on its results. Thus, unlike industry
associations, intergovernmental bodies, or NGOs, the Commission
could focus exclusively on the task at hand, relatively undisturbed by
rivalries, politics, emergencies, and strains that arise in the course of
a normal workday. Commission members operated on trust that they
would be given their opportunity to deliver results that would
advance the debate for everyone.
I am convinced that the Commission enjoyed unprecedented
legitimacy-the legitimacy of being the direct offspring of a highly
legitimate process. Unlike many other commissions, the WCD did
not owe its existence to the United Nations or to the decisions of
governments. It was not established at the initiative of a handful of
eminent personalities, as was the case for others, nor were the
members drawn exclusively from high-flyers and public figures.
Instead, the WCD emerged form a widely-shared perceived need.
It arose from a process that gave balanced access to all key
stakeholders in a format that they themselves accepted as legitimate.
The Commission owes its existence, its mandate, and its trust to the
stakeholders in the dams debate, not to a single person or group in
particular. This proved to be an extraordinary advantage. Even the
two "midwives"--the IUCN and the World Bank-stepped back
after the birth of the WCD to play no more than a supportive role
with all the other players. As a result, while the WCD was strongly
beholden to its stakeholders, it was not tied to any of them
specifically, not even to the governments or their intergovernmental
forums. The WCD came from the broad constituency for water and
energy development, and handed its results back to them. I believe
that this was unprecedented, and a critical ingredient in its success.
In addition, an extraordinarily eclectic range of sources funded the
WCD's work-fifty-three contributors, including governments,
international agencies, private sector companies, NGOs, and
foundations. Furthermore, in accordance with the Commission's
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mandate, all funding was "untied," with no conditions attached. The
funds raised were for allocation by the Commission and Secretariat,
as they deemed appropriate.
2. The Results Will Show Success
Second, the WCD possessed a tacit determination that the
evidence would speak for itself. There was no assumption that the
Commission's assessment of the development impact of large dams
would somehow gravitate to the middle of the spectrum, comfortably
locating itself midway between the radical anti-dam movement and
the dam promoters. Instead, the Commission went where the
evidence took it.
This has surprised and shocked more than a few, on both sides of
the spectrum. The Commission concluded that the negative impacts
of large dams are considerable and widespread. Many of the more
telling impacts-for example, on indigenous people-have been
hidden, ignored, or deliberately set aside. In this respect, the report is
bad news for dams proponents. On the other hand, the Commission's
assessment of the urgent water and energy needs of developing
countries strongly suggests that large dams must remain an option
available to planners in the future. The oft-announced demise of
large dams is, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated.
3. Consideration ofAll Factors
Third, the Commission's recommendations did not stem simply
from a technical or scientific sifting of the evidence. It placed a great
deal of emphasis on understanding what is happening to the planet,
the implications of the rapid global change recently witnessed, and
the impact on institutions, peoples, and ways of doing business. The
Commission started from the assumption that the only constant was
change. If we are in a period of transition to a new state of affairs, it
is because we have emerged from another period of transition and
are about to embark on another one.
The Commission understood that the uprooting of many
development assumptions may be disconcerting, but saw it as an
opportunity to correct many of the mistakes made in the past. It is
convinced that its assessment of the changes in development thinking
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is correct, and that it is heading for a policy convergence in which
the best in development, human rights, and sustainability thinking
will emerge to form a robust new conceptual framework for human
progress.
4. Formalistic Guidelines
Fourth, the Commission distilled this into two essential tools that
support its guidelines and recommendations. The first is the "rights
and risks" framework for decision-making. The second is the set of
values that we set out in Chapter 7 of the report. These tools are
central to the recommendations of the report.
They are based on the simple, but fundamental, reality that more
open and participatory decision-making processes will lead to better
decisions. Better decisions will minimize the number of bad projects,
and will instead ensure the pursuit of worthwhile projects with broad
public support. Fewer unworthwhile projects will lead to less
controversy and to more cooperation among parties.
So who participates, and what voice are they given? How can one
avoid an endless set of consultation with thousands of stakeholders,
leading to endless delays in the implementation of badly needed
development activities? The "rights and risks" approach identifies
stakeholders in any given decision by ascertaining who has rights in
the matter, and who is being asked-or obliged-to take a risk. The
voice given to these stakeholders in the decision-making process is
commensurate with the extent to which their rights are affected, and
the importance of the risks they are asked or forced to assume.
Since the stakeholders come from different social, political, and
cultural groups within society, they cannot all automatically be
expected to have the same capacity to participate, nor all be equally
effective in their participation. A new decision-making culture will
have to be nurtured, fed, and allowed to grow. To aid that process,
the Commission has five inalienable core values-equity, efficiency,
participatory decision-making, sustainability, and accountability-to





Fifth, the Commission has moved beyond the notion that a dam
project comes to one essential decision point, and that it is at this
point that the legitimacy of the process must be assured. Instead, it
sets out five key points ranging from need assessment to the scope
for improving the operation of dams for making essential decisions
and applying values. This step-by-step approach should enable
judicious decision-making before the stakes are raised through large-
scale investment or political expectation. Unworthwhile projects can
be stopped early through the consensual adoption of better options.
The Commission has not, however, insisted upon the immediate
unveiling of a perfect world, nor has it signed up to an unattainable
Utopia, the subject of its members'. It is well aware-and some
reaction to the report proves it-that the faithful implementation of
its recommendations would imply a fundamental shift in the conduct
of the dams business. The Commission's recommendations challenge
current and limiting concepts of national sovereignty and threaten the
alliance of interests that not long ago united leading business
concerns with water and energy authorities. The findings complicate
the way dams professionals work. Moreover, they will likely lead to
greater effort and rigor and, at times, greater front-end expenses.
However, the Commission members are convinced they will save
time and expense associated with controversy, and the need to
address the negative fallout from dams further down the line.
I do not envisage any negative implications for development,
national interests, or meeting the urgent priorities of water and
energy supply as long as the "rights and risks" framework is adopted,
the core values are respected, and the guidelines and
recommendations in the report are implemented in good faith. These
recommendations are practical, viable, affordable, and will lead to
substantially better development outcomes.
IV. HOW THE WCD REPORT HAS BEEN
RECEIVED
Having put so much of my own time and energy into the work of
the Commission, and having vested in it so much hope, it would be
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impossible to deny that I am gratified at the overwhelmingly positive
reception the report has received. All sides have stated their support
for the Commission's work, which has been awarded two prestigious
international prizes. It has also been rewarding to listen to the
numerous positive reactions coming from Forum members, their
determination to take the process forward, and their use of the report
in their work.
Yet, the report has not received a universal welcome. The negative
reaction comes principally from two sources. The first is a subset of
the dam industry and professional dam-building associations. The
report appears to have divided what was once a fairly unified front in
favor of dams. The more enlightened companies (and perhaps also
those with less at stake) have welcomed the report and pledged to
work with and be guided by it. The others feared that the WCD
guidelines and recommendations might rapidly become a condition
for doing business-a rigid standard without which any dam project
will win acceptance. A portion of these groups clearly hopes that the
Commission report will fade away.
The other source of resistance is, reportedly, a group of developing
country governments with strong dam-building programs who see
the Commission report as a threat to national sovereignty. I say
reportedly because much of this reaction has come to me second-
hand and is often based on misrepresentations rather than actual
reports. Further, it is clear that opinions within governments are far
from homogenous.
It is important to add that there appears to be a deep consensus
concerning the principles and values reflected in the report, as well
as the guidelines and strategic priorities. Disagreement arises
principally over the intended regulatory force of the guidelines. If
intended simply as guidelines, there is no problem. Everyone is
content to be guided by them and to take the report's many
recommendations at what each considers to be their value. The
disagreement arises when it appears that they will form the basis for
a new sine qua non standard.
Everyone, and every stakeholder group, is entitled to an opinion.
Not everyone must like, admire, or pledge to abide by what the
Commission has done. The WCD report is a tool for each
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stakeholder group to use to further advance its interests. It is my
fondest hope that acceptance of the report will grow and consolidate
so that in the long run, it will be inconceivable to approach a dam
development unless it is based upon the report's proposed approach.
I hope that, while not intended to be the basis for legal obligations,
the contents of the report will become a more widely accepted
normative framework.
CONCLUSION
The guidelines make it more difficult to proceed with dam projects
that do not respect the rights and risks of all key stakeholders and are
not decided with their full participation. Further, they should also
support and promote dam projects that meet the new development
test. In the two years of the Commission's existence, it has not
solved the urgent problems of water and energy supply. The
development imperative that has led to so many dams in the past
remains the same and must be addressed. Dams will always be part
of the mix.
In the end, the issue is not dams. Eliminating poverty and
deprivation, helping to meet human needs and bettering human
prospects is what the process of development must address. These
goals must be placed in the forefront. By putting the dams debate in
its correct context, the Commission hopes to have contributed to
these larger goals.
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